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AMENDING THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
ACT: CREATING A REBUTTABLE
PRESUMPTION OF GENDER ANIMUS IN RAPE
CASES
Jennifer Gaffney*
Rape is a man'S right. If a woman doesn't want to give it,
a man should take it. Women have no right to say no.
Women are made to have sex. It's all they are good for.
Some women would rather take a beating, but they always
give in ....1
INTRODUCTION
The Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA"), enacted in
1994, is a measure taken by Congress to address the growing
problem of violence against women in the United States.' Title Ill
of VAWA provides a civil rights remedy for victims of "gender-
motivated violence."4 A person who wishes to make a civil rights
* Brooklyn Law School Class of 1998; B.A. Cornell University, 1995. The
author would like to thank Edward, Diane & Hope Gaffney and Mark Schmidt
for their love and encouragement. The author would also like to thank Jennifer
Larrabee for her advice and friendship while we were writing our Notes.
'Interview with a rapist reported in DIANA SCULLY, UNDERSTANDING
SEXUAL VIOLENCE: A STUDY OF CONVICTED RAPISTS 166 (1990).
2 Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title IV, 108 Stat. 1902 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8, 18 and 42 U.S.C. (1994)).
3 S. REP. No. 138, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1993).
4 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994). The relevant text of the Title III, Civil Rights
Remedy is as follows:
(a) Purpose .... [Ilt is the purpose of this subtitle to protect the civil
rights of victims of gender-motivated violence and to promote public
safety, health, and activities affecting interstate commerce by establish-
ing a Federal civil rights cause of action for victims of crimes
motivated by gender.
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claim under VAWA must prove that an act was committed against
her (or him) which rises to the level of a felony, was committed
based on gender and contains some display of "gender animus. ''
(b) Right to be free from crimes of violence. All persons within the
United States shall have the right to be free from crimes of violence
motivated by gender (as defined in subsection (d)).
(c) Cause of action. A person... who commits a crime of violence
motivated by gender and thus deprives another of the right declared in
subsection (b) shall be liable to the party injured ....
(d) Definitions. For purposes of this section-
(1) the term "crime of violence motivated by gender" means a crime
of violence committed because of gender or on the basis of gender,
and due, at least in part, to an animus based on the victim's gender;
and
(2) the term "crime of violence" means-
(A) an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony ... if the
conduct presents a serious risk of physical injury to another, that would
come within the meaning of State or Federal offenses described in
section 16 of title 18, United States Code, whether or not those acts
have actually resulted in criminal charges, prosecution, or conviction
... and
(B) includes an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony
described in subparagraph (A) but for the relationship between the
person who takes such action and the individual against whom such
action is taken.
(e) Limitations and procedures.
(1) Limitation. Nothing in this section entitles a person to a cause of
action under subsection (c) for random acts of violence unrelated to
gender or for acts that cannot be demonstrated, by a preponderance of
the evidence, to be motivated by gender (within the meaning of
subsection (d)).
Id. § 13981.
5 Id. § 13981(c), (d).
For purposes of this Note, "animus" is defined as a "disposition" tending toward
"hatred of or condescension toward ... women as a class." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 87 (6th ed. 1990). See Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic,
506 U.S. 263, 270 (1993). "Condescension toward" women includes disrespect
for and/or dislike of women, which falls short of "hatred," based on a view of
women as inferior. According to Supreme Court authority, a finding of
"invidiously discriminatory animus" does not require a finding of hatred, but
merely a finding of discrimination which is "arbitrary, irrational and not
reasonably related to a legitimate purpose." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra,
248
VAWA AND GENDER ANIMUS
This Note argues that Congress should amend VAWA such that
the requirement that a plaintiff prove gender animus be replaced
with a rebuttable presumption of gender animus in all cases of
rape.6 Part I provides a general background of the problem of
violence against women and the history of VAWA. Part II
identifies the problem of using models for determining "animus"
from civil rights laws and hate-crime statutes in an effort to prove
gender animus in rape cases brought under VAWA. Part III
discusses current interpretations of gender animus under VAWA,
as defined by members of Congress and the federal judiciary, and
the difficulties with these constructions. Part IV argues that because
all rape is motivated by gender animus, Congress should amend
VAWA to do away with the gender animus requirement in rape
cases. Part V discusses rebuttable presumptions generally, and
proposes a legislative amendment applying a rebuttable presump-
tion to the gender animus requirement of VAWA. This Note
concludes that because all rape is motivated, at least in part, by
gender animus, Congress should adopt a rebuttable presumption
under VAWA's Title III Civil Rights Remedy which recognizes
this fact.
I. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF VAWA
The statistics surrounding violence against women are alarming.
A woman is raped every five minutes in the United States,
according to statistics gathered by the FBI.7 Estimates show that
between thirteen and twenty-five percent of women will be raped
at 826.
6 For purposes of this Note, "rape" is defined as "unwanted sexual contact
obtained without consent through the use of coercion or force or misrepresenta-
tion. Sexual contact can be intercourse, oral sex, anal sex, or vaginal and/or anal
penetration with objects." Brande Stellings, Note, The Public Harm of Private
Violence: Rape, Sex Discrimination and Citizenship, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
185, 185 n.1 (1993).
' Id. at 197 (citing Staff of Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.,
Report on Violence Against Women: The Increase of Rape in America iii
(1990)).
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in their lifetimes.8 Congress found that up to four million women
are victimized by domestic violence each year.9 Even more
disturbing than these bare statistics is Congress's finding that
"women are six times more likely than men to be the victim of a
violent crime committed by an intimate."' 0 Women are not only
being victimized in extraordinary numbers, but this abuse is being
inflicted upon them by those to whom they are the closest: their
husbands, boyfriends, family members and friends. Such instances
of violence against women, combined with the historic failure of
states to properly address such violence," and a desire for national
uniformity in addressing violence against women,' 2 prompted
Congress to introduce, and eventually pass, VAWA.
13
8 NANCY A. CROWELL & ANN W. BURGESS, UNDERSTANDING VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 1 (1996). See also Women and Violence: Hearings on
Legislation to Reduce the Growing Problem of Violent Crime Against Women
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Part I, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990)
(reporting that one of five women will be raped in their lifetimes).
9 S. REP. No. 138, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 37, 38 (1993).
I0 Id.
Id. at 41-42. The Senate report recognized that the historic acceptance of
family violence embodied in the common law "rule of thumb" leaves a legacy
which "endures even today," as evidenced by studies demonstrating police
failures to arrest abusers even where a wife is found bleeding. Id. The report also
recognized police and prosecutorial deficiencies in the arrest and prosecution of
rape cases where, for example:
over 60 percent of rape reports [did] not result in arrests; and a rape
case [was] more than twice as likely to be dismissed as a murder case
and nearly 40 percent more likely to be dismissed than a robbery case.
[In addition, 1]ess than half of the individuals arrested for rape [were]
convicted of rape.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See 140 CONG. REC. S6098-02, S6102 (daily ed. May 19,
1994) (statement of Sen. Biden) (stating that one reason for the Civil Rights
Remedy is that "State remedies have too often proved inadequate").
12 S. REP. No. 138, at 41 (asserting that "[VAWA] represents an essential
step in forging a national consensus that our society will not tolerate violence
against women") (emphasis added). See 140 CONG. REC. at S6102 (stating that
a second reason for the Civil Rights Remedy is that "the Federal courts have
traditionally been charged with enforcing national principles of equality").
13 In 1990, Senator Biden (D-Del) first introduced VAWA "in response to
the escalating problem of violence against women." S. REP. NO. 138, at 37. The
act was reintroduced and reworked in each succeeding Congress until its eventual
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The Civil Rights Remedy of VAWA recognizes that gender-
based violence is a form of sexual discrimination which violates
women's civil rights, thus creating a federal interest in remedying
this violence. 14 Congress has no authority, however, to legislate
in the general areas of criminal or tort law, as these areas are
reserved to the states to regulate. 15 In enacting the Civil Rights
Remedy, Congress found its authority grounded in both the
Commerce Clause 16 and the Fourteenth Amendment 17 of the
United States Constitution. 8 Thus, Congress recognized that in
order to create a remedy for gender-motivated violence under
federal law, this violence must be shown to violate more than state
criminal or tort law.' 9
The requirement of "gender animus" was created to enable
federal law to remedy those acts of gender-motivated violence
which are viewed as moving beyond basic criminal or tort law
violations, where the underlying discriminatory "animus" consti-
passage in 1994. Id. at 39-40 (discussing legislative history of VAWA through
the 102d and 103d Congress, including numerous hearings before the Judiciary
Committee, and the eventual bi-partisan bill introduced by Senators Biden and
Hatch (R-Utah) which served to refine Senate Bill 11, the VAWA of 1993).
14 S. REP. No. 138, at 48.
'5 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (noting that
"States historically have been sovereign" in the areas of criminal law and
education); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636 (1968) (recognizing state
"power to protect the health, safety, welfare and morals of its community");
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 74 (1917) (recognizing "[t]he authority of the
State to pass laws in the exercise of the police power, having for their object the
promotion of the public health, safety and welfare ... ").
16 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("Congress shall have the Power . .. [t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States ..... ").
'7 U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1 ("No state shall ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
"8 S. REP. No. 138, at 54-55 (defining Congress' power to enact VAWA
under the Commerce Clause and section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
19 Id. at 51 (noting that the Civil Rights Remedy requires proof of a gender-
discriminatory motive and because of this requirement "Title HI does not expand
Federal jurisdiction to all attacks against women, nor does it supplant all State
tort law"). See 140 CONG. REc. at S6102 (distinguishing VAWA Civil Rights
Remedy from "other litigation traditionally reserved to the State courts" and
making an analogy to post-Civil War civil rights legislation).
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tutes a civil rights violation.2 ° Unfortunately, in creating the
requirement that a plaintiff prove "gender animus," Congress has
failed to recognize that certain acts of gender-motivated violence,
including rape, are almost always motivated by gender animus and
generally constitute civil rights violations.
II. THE PROBLEM OF PROVING GENDER ANIMUS
Early commentaries following the enactment of VAWA
recognized that there might be some difficulty in determining what
constitutes "gender animus" under the Civil Rights Remedy.21
Other observers believed that the difficulty might not be too
22great. Arguably, two areas of law could provide guidance in
20 S. REP. 138, at 50-51. Congress considered the gender animus provision
of the Civil Rights Remedy to be a special limitation section.
[This] special limitation section specifically provides that "random"
crimes not motivated by gender are not covered by the statute and do
not give rise to a cause of action. A cause of action cannot be
established by saying "I am a woman; I have an injury; ergo, I have
a civil rights claim." ... Title III does not expand Federal jurisdiction
to all attacks against women, nor does it supplant all State tort law.
... For a cause of action to arise under title IH, a plaintiff must prove
that the crime of violence-whether an assault, a kidnapping, or
rape-was motivated by gender.
Id.
21 See, e.g., Birgit Schmidt Am Busch, Domestic Violence and Title III of
the Violence Against Women Act of 1993: A Feminist Critique, 6 HASTINGS
WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 15 (1995) (noting that the gender animus requirement might bar
many domestic violence victims from using the Civil Rights Remedy as it would
be difficult to prove gender animus in cases where the abuser and the victim
have an intimate relationship because the abuser can claim that the violence was
not gender-motivated but rather was directed toward the individual person for
some other reason); Adam Candeub, Comment, Motive Crimes and Other Minds,
142 U. PA. L. REv. 2071, 2074 (1994) (questioning how courts will determine
whether crimes are motivated by gender when intent is difficult to determine in
the most obvious criminal cases).
22 See, e.g., Sally Goldfarb, The Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against
Women Act: Legislative History, Policy Implications & Litigation Strategy, A
Panel Discussion Sponsored by the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, September 14, 1995, 4 J.L. & POL'Y 391, 398 (1996) (remarking that
proving gender animus "is not as onerous as some have argued").
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interpreting "animus" under VAWA. First, one might look at the
definition of "animus" under Title 42, United States Code, Section
1985(3), the modem equivalent of section 2 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1871.23 Second, at least one commentator has suggested that
"gender animus" might be determined by a "totality of the
circumstances" test similar to the analysis used for other hate
crimes.24 Unfortunately, as will be shown,25 neither area of law
is sufficient to define "animus" so as to be consistent with the
purpose of VAWA.
The Supreme Court has interpreted section 1985(3) as requiring
"some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously
discriminatory animus ' '26 before the statute can be invoked to
punish a conspiracy to deprive a person of "equal enjoyment of
rights secured by the law to all. 27 In Griffin v. Breckenridge, the
23 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1996) provides:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire, or go in
disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose
of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of
persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and
immunities under the laws, or for the purpose of preventing or
hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from
giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the
equal protection of the laws; ... if one or more persons engaged
therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of
such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property,
or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen
of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an
action for the recovery of damages.
Id.
24 See W.H. Hallock, Note, The Violence Against Women Act: Civil Rights
for Sexual Assault Victims, 68 IND. L.J. 577, 603-10 (1993) (arguing that gender
animus under VAWA may be proved by the totality of the circumstances test
used under Title VII and other civil rights legislation and, in addition, outlining
FBI guidelines for determining whether a crime was motivated by hate, and
applying this totality of the circumstances model to potential scenarios under
VAWA).
25 See infra notes 40-48 and accompanying text (discussing totality of
circumstances test and possible application to rape cases under VAWA).
26 Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971).
27 Id.
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Court distinguished between "invidiously discriminatory animus 28
and the "specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right. ' 9
This distinction may be used to exclude crimes against a woman,
such as rape and battery, from the definition of "animus" under
section 1985(3) because these crimes are often viewed as private
acts rather than acts affecting women as a class.30
An example of this distinction is found in Bray v. Alexandria
Women's Health Clinic.3' In Bray, the Supreme Court held that
acts opposing abortion did not reflect an "invidiously discrimina-
tory animus" directed at women as a class.32 Justice Scalia wrote
that "opposition to voluntary abortion cannot possibly be consid-
ered such an irrational surrogate for opposition to (or paternalism
towards) women. 33 Because there are alternative explanations for
opposition to abortion, the Court refused to acknowledge that there
might be an additional (and perhaps unstated) reason for this
opposition, that is, an underlying "discriminatory animus" directed
at women. 34 In making this judgment, Justice Scalia ignores
arguments showing that opposition to abortion affects not only
individual women seeking the procedure, but affects women as a
class.3 5 Following the logic set forth in Bray, rape cannot be
28 Id.
29 Id. at 102 n.10 (citing Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945), a
plurality opinion involving prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 242).
3o See generally Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as
Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117 (discussing how the notion of
family privacy has historically precluded law enforcement officials from
protecting the victims of domestic violence against their husbands). See also Beth
C. Miller, A Comparison of American and Jewish Legal Views on Rape, 5
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 182, 201 (1996) (noting that the classification of
marital sex as "private" was the historical basis for the exemption of marital rape
from criminal prosecution).
3' 506 U.S. 263 (1993).
32 Id. at 269, 274.
33 Id. at 270.
34 Id. at 271.
31 Id. (noting that the respondent in Bray argued that since only women can
have an abortion, to oppose abortion is "ipso facto to discriminate invidiously
against women as a class"). See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex
Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1318-20, 1323 (1991). MacKinnon
explains that the criminalizing of abortion and the denial of funds for abortion
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viewed as displaying gender animus so long as alternative explana-
tions for an individual rape exist.
In effect, the Supreme Court in Bray has revealed that it is
looking for obvious animus in section 1985(3) cases. An example
of obvious animus, given by the Court, would be to impose "[a]
tax on wearing yarmulkes ' 3 6 which would clearly be "a tax on
Jews.",37 As the gender-discriminatory motivation behind rape is
not always this obvious, using a narrow section 1985(3) interpreta-
tion of animus for rape cases brought under VAWA would be
inconsistent with the purposes of the Act.38 That VAWA is
intended to look beyond the obvious is evidenced in Title 42,
United States Code, section 13981(d)(1) which requires that a
gender-motivated crime be due "at least in part, to an animus based
on the victim's gender., 3 9 This recognizes that crimes often have
more than one motivating factor, and that courts may find gender
animus even where another obvious intent first comes to mind.
Under this construction, one possible motive does not rule out all
others, as occurred in Bray.
An alternative to the narrow definition of animus under section
1985(3) is the "totality of the circumstances" test. This test has
been adopted by Title VII and other civil rights legislation in order
to determine whether a discriminatory motive was present in a
violate equal protection. She cites these acts as examples of "sex inequality" as
"only women can be disadvantaged, for a reason specific to sex, through state-
mandated restrictions on abortion." Id. at 1319-20. In addition, MacKinnon notes
that abortions are often necessary because of "social conditions of sex inequal-
ity." Id. at 1319. For example, domestic violence or poverty in a woman's life,
which are ultimately caused by sex inequality, may force a woman to choose
abortion. Finally, MacKinnon asserts that equality in areas such as reproductive
control, control over "sexual access to [a woman's] bod[y]" before pregnancy,
and day care, as well as the "economic parity between women and men" "would
overwhelmingly reduce the numbers of abortions sought"). Id. at 1323.
36 Bray, 506 U.S. at 271.
37 Id.
38 See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text (discussing purposes of
VAWA).
39 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(1) (emphasis added).
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given crime.40 Common criteria used to identify hate crimes
include:
*Common sense (use of a swastika or burning of a cross
on the victim's lawn).
*Statements by the perpetrator showing bias.
*Display of offensive symbols or pictures.
*The absence of any other apparent motive (such as an
assault without robbery).
*Crime occurs during or near holiday or event significant
to the target group (e.g. Hanukkah, Martin Luther King
Day, Chinese New Year, Gay and Lesbian Parade).
*Perception of the victim that the crime was bias-motiva-
ted.
*Lack of provocation.
*Severity of the attack (e.g. mutilation of the victim).
*History of similar crimes by the same perpetrator or in
the same area.41
Under the "totality of the circumstances" test, certain acts of
rape will be identifiable as gender-based bias crimes. For example,
the paradigmatic "stranger rape" does not suggest any motive other
than gender bias (that is, the perpetrator raped the victim, but he
did not rob her purse); the attack may be severe (perhaps even
including mutilation or slashing of the victim); there is a clear lack
of provocation (that is, the victim does not even know the
perpetrator); the perpetrator may use language suggesting gender-
' See Hallock, supra note 24, at 603. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1994)
(a denial or abridgement of voting rights based upon race or color is established
if a "totality of the circumstances" shows "that the political processes leading to
nomination or election... are not equally open to participation by members of
a class of citizens"); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1997) (mandating that the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, "in determining whether alleged conduct
constitutes sexual harassment .... [shall look at] the totality of the circumst-
ances"). See also F.B.I., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING
SUMMARY REPORTING SYSTEM AND NATIONAL INCIDENT-BASED REPORTING
SYSTEM: DRAFT HATE CRIME DATA COLLECTION GUIDELINES (1990) (enumerat-
ing thirteen items which might be used as circumstantial evidence to prove that
a crime is motivated by racial or other bias).
41 AMY STEPHSON, NORTHWEST WOMEN'S LAW CENTER, GENDER BIAS
CRIMES: A LEGISLATIVE RESOURCE MANUAL 2 (1994).
256
VAWA AND GENDER ANIMUS
bias (that is, calling the victim a "bitch" or a "whore"); and the
perpetrator may have a history of raping or sexually assaulting
women.4 2 However, the nature of many gender-based bias crimes
is such that numerous individual instances of rape will not fall
within the scope of factors generally used to detect bias motivation.
For example, marital rape may be inaccurately viewed as having a
motive other than gender bias (that is, a personal desire to have
intercourse with one's wife); the attack might not appear severe (as
a wife might not physically resist her husband's force); provocation
may be inferred from other aspects of the marital relationship (that
is, the couple may have been arguing); gender-based language
might not be used; and the perpetrator's history may include raping
his wife, but not other women. If a totality of the circumstances
test is applied to VAWA, such an interpretation of marital rape will
likely allow rapist-husbands to escape from liability under the Act,
thus clearly defeating the legislative intent behind VAWA.43
Furthermore, the fact that gender-bias is not included in many
hate-crime statutes is evidence that there is a perceived distinction
between gender-based hate crimes and other crimes of discrimina-
tion.' The distinction made is that personal relationships existing
42 See id. at 10 (discussing factors that may be used to identify gender-bias
crimes).
41 One purpose of VAWA is to provide a Civil Rights Remedy for women
who are denied remedies against their husbands under state laws providing for
a marital rape exemption or interspousal tort immunity. See, e.g., S. REP. No.
138, at 42 (noting the inadequate response of the legal system to crimes against
women, including Congressional findings that "[a] few States still fail to
recognize rape of a spouse as a criminal act [see infra note 51 for more recent
data regarding the marital rape exemption]; other States do not prosecute
husbands for rape unless a wife suffers additional degrees of violence like
kidnapping or being threatened with a weapon; others classify rape of a spouse
as a less serious crime with lesser penalties").
"See Steven Bennett Weisburd & Brian Levin, Symposium, "On the Basis
of Sex": Recognizing Gender-Based Bias Crimes, 5 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 21,
34 & n.117 (1994) (reporting that many states have excluded the category of
gender from hate crime statutes). But see STEPHSON, supra note 41, at 30-31
(listing fourteen states with hate crime statutes providing protection for gender,
including Alaska, California, Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Nevada, New York, North Dakota, Vermont, Washington and West
Virginia, as well as the District of Columbia). On the federal level, the Hate
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between the victim and aggressor in certain crimes disqualifies
such crimes from being "gender-based., 45 This is known as the
"lack of victim interchangeability" argument. However, the
presence of a personal relationship should not preclude crimes from
being labeled as motivated by gender.46 The fact that many states
accept this argument suggests that the adoption of a totality of the
circumstances test under VAWA will constrain many victims of
rape from procuring a Civil Rights Remedy due to a personal
relationship with the aggressors.4 7 If one accepts that all rape is
committed because the perpetrator entertains some degree of gender
animus,48 then it follows that a totality of the circumstances test,
as used for other hate crimes, must not be used under VAWA as
it may preclude many victims from successfully asserting claims
under the Civil Rights Remedy.
III. GENDER ANIMUS AS PRESENTLY DEFINED UNDER VAWA
VAWA's supporters on Capitol Hill have interpreted the Act in
two ways. Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), a co-sponsor of VAWA,
Crime Statistics Act of 1990, Public Law 101-275, 28 U.S.C. § 534, does not
include gender as a category. STEPHSON, supra note 41, at 5 (noting that the Hate
Crime Statistics Act requires the Department of Justice to collect statistics
concerning cases where there is "evidence of prejudice based on race, religion,
sexual orientation, or ethnicity" or disability but does not require the same
recording for cases involving gender-bias).
45 STEPHSON, supra note 41, at 12 (discussing the argument that a personal
relationship between a victim and her attacker may suggest a motive for the
crime, other than gender-bias).
4STEPHSON, supra note 41, at 12-13.
47 The acceptance of this argument is indicated by the prevalence of state
statutes which exclude gender-bias from hate crimes. These states include:
Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Maryland, Maine, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia and Wisconsin. STEPHSON, supra note 41,
at 30-31 (reprinting the Anti-Defamation League's chart of "State Hate Crime
Statutory Provisions," which reflects the statutory provisions for the fifty states
and the District of Columbia).
4' For a discussion of the argument that all rape is motivated, to some
degree, by gender animus, see infra, Part IV.
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distinguished between rapes motivated by gender animus and those
committed due to some other motivation:
Say you have a man who believes a woman in attractive.
He feels encouraged by her and he's so motivated by that
encouragement that he rips her clothes off and has sex
with her against her will. Now let's say you have another
man who grabs a woman off some lonely road and in the
process of raping her says words like, "You're wearing a
skirt! You're a woman! I hate woman! I'm going to show
you, you woman!" Now, the first one's terrible. But the
other's much worse. If a man rapes a woman while telling
her he loves her, that's afar cry from saying he hates her.
A lust factor does not spring from animus.49
Clearly for Senator Hatch, marital rape would not constitute a
civil rights violation under VAWA, as a husband most likely
"loves" his wife. If this were the proper interpretation of VAWA,
there would be no need for Section 13981(d)(2)(B),5 ° which
applies VAWA to cases of marital rape and domestic violence
which would be excluded under state laws providing for some
variation of a marital rape exemption or interspousal tort immu-
nity.51 Senator Hatch's distinction between rapes predicated on
49 Ruth Shalit, Caught in the Act; Congress; Violence Against Women Act
of 1993, THE NEw REPUBLIC, July 12, 1993, at 12 (emphasis added).
'0 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(2)(B) (1994) ("The term 'crime of violence'
includes an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony described in
subparagraph (A) but for the relationship between the person who takes such
action and the individual against whom such action is taken.").
"' In nine states, spouses are barred from making claims of intentional torts,
either in whole or in part, by the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity. See
Siegel, supra note 30, at 2163 & n.163 (noting that Florida and Louisiana retain
the doctrine in its entirety). Although no state retains an absolute marital rape
exemption, one author has counted "at least thirteen states [that] still offer
preferential or disparate treatment to perpetrators of spousal sexual assault." Lisa
R. Eskow, The Ultimate Weapon?: Demythologizing Spousal Rape and
Reconceptualizing Its Prosecution, 48 STAN. L. REv. 677, 682 & n.35 (1996)
(listing the following states offering preferential or disparate treatment: Arizona,
California, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maryland, Nevada, Tennessee, Washington and West Virginia). For example,
Idaho allows a wife to prosecute her husband for rape only where he uses force,
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"lust" and those based on "animus" is grounded in the notion that
it is more comprehendible to rape a woman when her attractiveness
disables a man from controlling his passion. Under this construc-
tion, rape would only violate a woman's civil rights when it is
based on an explicit, overt dislike of women. The fact that rape is
an expression of underlying societal views toward women,52 and
the socialization of men to believe all women are inferior and made
to be acted upon by force, 53 is ignored in the Hatch interpretation
of "gender animus."
Alternatively, Senator Joseph Biden (D-Del.), the primary
sponsor of VAWA, commented that "[t]heoretically, I guess, a rape
could take place that was not driven by gender animus, but I can't
think of what it would be."54 This statement might have elicited
hope among those proponents of VAWA who consider all rape to
be motivated by gender animus. 5 However, the first decision to
be rendered with respect to rape and VAWA, Brzonkala v. Virginia
Polytechnic Institute & State University,56 does not bode well for
those in the Biden camp.
On the evening of September 21, 1994, Christy Brzonkala, a
student at Virginia Polytechnic University, and her friend and
fellow student, Hope Handley, met, for the first time, two men who
identified themselves as members of the football team. 7 Christy
and Hope joined the two football players, who were later identified
violence or a threat of harm but not where he rapes her while she is temporarily
incapable of consent or where she is unconscious. IDAHO CODE §§ 18-6101, 18-
6107 (1997). A person may be prosecuted for raping an unconscious person,
however, where that person is not his or her spouse. Id.
52 See infra Part IV (arguing that all rape reflects animus towards women
which is developed through the American male socialization process).
53 SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE
389 (1975) (noting that "[t]he theory of aggressive male domination over women
as a natural right is so deeply embedded in our cultural value system ... ([and
includes notions of] man as doer; woman as bystander).
14 Shalit, supra note 49, at 12.
" See, e.g., Hallock, supra note 24, at 609-10 (optimistically commenting
that rape will eventually be seen as "a per se act of gender bias" under VAWA).
56 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996).
17 Id. at 781-82.
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as Morrison and Crawford, in a third floor dormitory room.58
After approximately fifteen minutes, Hope and Crawford left the
room.5 9 Immediately after the two left, Morrison asked Christy to
engage in sexual intercourse, to which she twice responded
4" '  Morrison then forcibly raped Christy, pinning her down
with his hands and knees in such a manner that she could not push
him away.61 Crawford returned to the room and proceeded to rape
Christy before she could recover from the first rape by
Morrison. 62 Morrison then raped Christy a third time.63 Five
months after this event, Christy learned the true identities of both
Morrison and Crawford and filed a complaint against both men
under Virginia Polytechnic's Sexual Assault Policy.64 Crawford
was found not guilty; Morrison was found guilty of sexual assault;
however, sanctions against him were set aside without notice to
Christy.6 1
Christy Brzonkala eventually filed a claim against both
Morrison and Virginia Polytechnic under the VAWA Civil Rights
Remedy.66 In a memorandum opinion, Chief Judge Jackson L.
Kiser found that gender animus was present in the rape of Christy
Brzonkala.67 Although this finding might seem favorable to the
58 id.







66 Id. at 781.
67 Id. at 785. Notwithstanding Judge Kiser's finding of gender animus,
Christy Brzonkala did not prevail because the Judge also found the law
unconstitutional in its entirety. Id. at 801 ("Although plaintiff states a claim
under VAWA ... VAWA is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress's power,
unjustified under either the Commerce Clause or the Enforcement Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment."). This issue is now on appeal in the 4th Circuit. Four
other District Courts have deemed the law constitutional under the Commerce
Clause. Anisimov v. Lake, 1997 WL 538718 at *12 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 1997)
(upholding VAWA Civil Rights Remedy as constitutional under the Commerce
Clause but declining to address constitutionality under the Equal Protection
clause); Seaton v. Seaton, 971 F. Supp. 1188, 1195-96 (E.D. Tenn. 1997) (mem.)
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
proponents of VAWA on its face, the reasoning underlying Chief
Judge Kiser's opinion is quite disturbing.
Chief Judge Kiser based his finding of gender animus on three
factors. First, he found that the rape was similar to a gang rape,
thus suggesting a conspiracy against one woman.68 Second, he
found language suggesting gender animus. Specifically, after raping
Brzonkala, Morrison said "[y]ou better not have any fucking
diseases," showing disrespect toward Brzonkala.69 Additionally,
months later Morrison stated in a dining hall, filled with both men
and women, "I like to get girls drunk and fuck the shit out of
them," showing disrespect for all women.7 ° Finally, Chief Judge
Kiser suggested that Brzonkala's rape was close to a stranger rape
and, therefore, was likely to be the product of gender animus, as
Morrison and Crawford had little personal knowledge of their
victim. 71
The rationale in this memorandum opinion outlines a series of
distinctions between types of rape, all of which fall on a continuum
similar to that created by Senator Hatch's "lust" or "animus" rape
distinction.72 Chief Judge Kiser asserted that "gang rape generally
is more egregious than one-on-one rape"73 and that "stranger rape
and rapes such as the one in question generally are more egregious
than date rape., 74 According to Chief Judge Kiser, date rape may
not involve gender animus but "could involve a misunderstanding
and is often less violent than stranger rape ' 75 or might "involve
(upholding VAWA under Commerce Clause but expressing fear that it might
"become a gateway for domestic relations issues to slip into this federal court");
Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp. 1375, 1423 & n.38 (N.D. Iowa 1997) (upholding
VAWA under Commerce Clause but failing to address Equal Protection clause);
Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608, 617 (D. Conn. 1996) (upholding VAWA under
Commerce Clause).
6' Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 784.
69 Id. at 785.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 784-85.
72 See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text (discussing Orrin Hatch's
lust/animus distinction).
73 Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 784.
74 Id. at 784-85.
71 Id. at 785.
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a situation where a man's sexual passion provokes the rape by
decreasing the man's control. 76 Apparently the Hatch construc-
tion of VAWA, including traditional rape myths,77 has found its
way into the case law and prevailed over the Biden construction.78
Following Brzonkala, it is reasonable to expect that further
developing case law under VAWA will likewise reflect traditional
gender biases, rape myths and sexual stereotypes.79 Such a
development in the law may preclude many rape victims from
seeking relief under VAWA as the language of traditional stereo-
types will defeat arguments tending to prove that gender animus
was present in a given rape. Unfortunately, the sexual stereotypes
which may impede women from bringing successful claims under
VAWA are the same stereotypes which create and foster the gender
animus motivating most rapes.
76 Id.
77 See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text (discussing Hatch
construction of VAWA). Some examples of traditional rape myths include the
ideas that "it wasn't rape, only 'rough sex' (a misunderstanding); the act was
not harmful because there are no bruises; the victim precipitated her rape by the
way she dressed or acted; and the man "didn't mean it." MARY P. Koss et. al.,
No SAFE HAVEN: MALE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AT HOME, AT WORK, AND
IN THE COMMUNITY 8-9 (1994) (charting "Common myths and stereotypes about
male violence against women").
" See supra note 54 and accompanying text (discussing Biden construction
of VAWA).
7' The second rape case decided under VAWA, Anisimov v. Lake, 1997 WL
538718 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 1997), explicitly rejected the "broad characterizations
of rape made in Brzonkala," and stated that rape cases not motivated by gender
"appear to th[e] Court to be few and far between." 1997 WL 538718 at *13.
However, the court stated that the issue of "whether a crime is motivated by
gender-must be addressed on a case by case basis." Id. That this one court
rejected the rationale set forth in Brzonkala does not change the fact that other
District Courts and Circuit Courts considering rape cases under VAWA may still
apply the sexual stereotypes cited in Brzonkala and historically found in court
decisions involving rape cases.
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IV. ALL RAPE As MOTIVATED BY GENDER ANIMUS
Contrary to the belief of Senator Hatch and others, rape is
rarely, if ever, caused by "lust" or "sexual passion."8° Instead,
numerous individual determinants may cause a person to rape.8"
In addition to those various determinants, gender animus is an
underlying factor in almost all rapes. The presence of gender
animus in rape is twofold. First, the American socialization process
teaches men to harbor gender animus. When this learned gender
animus (be it conscious or unconscious) is combined with other
factors, it may cause a man to rape. Second, acts of rape are a
means of asserting power and control over women, thus serving to
subordinate women. As such, instances of rape are overt displays
of gender animus or hostility toward women as a class.
The American socialization process has deep historical roots
and is reflected in and reproduced by sexual stereotypes in popular
culture.82 Historically, rape was considered a property crime
against the man to whom the rape victim "belonged., 83 Marital
rape was considered impossible. 84 The definition of rape eventu-
ally changed from a property crime to a crime against a person.
8o CROWELL, supra note 8, at 59 (discussing research which has found "that
motives of power and anger are more prominent in the rationalizations for sexual
aggression than sexual desires"); Koss, supra note 77, at 29 (noting a study
suggesting that power and anger motives in nonincarcerated sexually aggressive
men may outweigh sex motives).
"' See infra notes 140-142 (discussing individual determinants).
82 CROWELL, supra note 8, at 62-69.
83 BROWNMILLER, supra note 53, at 18 ("Rape entered the law through the
back door, as it were, as a property crime of man against man. Woman, of
course, was viewed as the property."). See RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND
REASON 395 (1992) ("Traditionally, rape was the offense of depriving a father
or husband of a valuable asset-his wife's chastity or his daughter's virginity."
(footnote omitted)).
84 CROWELL, supra note 8, at 65; SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 72 (1987)
(quoting Lord Chief Justice Hale's assertion that "the husband cannot be guilty
of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual
matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto
her husband, which she cannot retract" (citing 1 HALE, HISTORY OF PLEAS OF
THE CROWN 629)).
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However, rape laws were typically written to require stringent
proof, including a showing of physical force by a defendant85 and
a woman's physical resistance8 6 to prove non-consent and corrob-
oration. 7 These strict requirements often discouraged rape victims
" Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1095, 1098-99 (discussing force
requirement for rape cases and noting that force is generally "defined according
to the woman's will to resist").
16 See People v. Carey, 223 N.Y. 519, 520 (per curiam) (1918) The Carey
court defined "utmost resistance" as follows: "Rape is not committed unless the
woman oppose the man to the utmost limit of her power. A feigned or passive
or perfunctory resistance is not enough. It must be genuine and active and
proportioned to the outrage." Id. (citation omitted). The Carey court reversed the
rape conviction of "a youth of 19 years" based upon a lack of evidence proving
utmost resistance where the defendant testified that the complainant consented
to engage in intercourse with him once in the past and the complainant, "an
unmarried woman," testified that defendant had taken liberties with her in the
past, and that she continued to allow him to visit. Id. at 519-20. See also State
v. Beeny, 203 P.2d 397 (Utah 1949). The Beeny court held that a prosecutrix
need not have made "uttermost resistance" but must only "do what her age,
strength, the surrounding facts and all attending circumstances make it reasonable
for her to do in order to manifest opposition to the act of sexual intercourse."
Id. at 399. However, the court noted that "[mlere objections in words, or such
objections coupled with some resistance are not enough to ... constitute rape."
Id.
" For an example of a state law requiring corroboration, see, e.g., State v.
Elsen, 187 P.2d 976 (Idaho 1947). The Elsen court described the Idaho
corroboration rule as follows:
A defendant may be convicted of the crime of rape upon the uncorrob-
orated testimony of the prosecutrix; but this is only so when the
character of the prosecutrix for chastity, as well as for truth, is
unimpeached, and where the circumstances surrounding the commis-
sion of the offense are clearly corroborative of the statements of the
prosecutrix.
Id. at 977.
The twelve year old prosecutrix in Elsen was impeached by her own
testimony that she had engaged in sexual intercourse with two men other than
the defendant. Thus, the court required direct evidence of the alleged rape. Id.
at 978. The prosecutrix testified that the fifty-nine year old defendant had sexual
intercourse with her in a car on the way to a hotel, then denied being with the
prosecutrix at all on the night in question. Three witnesses testified to seeing the
defendant with the prosecutrix at the hotel she testified about; however, the court
found this evidence insufficient to corroborate the rape and reversed the
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from reporting the crimes.88 In cases where a victim did report a
rape and the case advanced to trial, the rape victim was often
cross-examined in a victim-blaming manner.8 9
In recent years, rape laws have been amended so as to eliminate
requirements such as force, "utmost resistance" and corrobora-
tion.9° Additionally, rape-shield laws have been enacted on both
defendant's conviction. Id. at 978-79. See also Strickland v. State, 61 S.E.2d 118,
120-22 (Ga. 1950) (stating a general rule that "there can be no conviction for
rape.., on the uncorroborated testimony of the female upon whom the alleged
offense was committed" but finding sufficient corroboration where a thirteen year
old girl, raped by her uncle and temporary guardian in Georgia, promptly
reported the incident to her mother in Florida and left school in Georgia,
immediately moving in with her mother earlier than they had planned).
For a general discussion of old rape statutes, see CROWELL, supra note 8,
at 124-25 ("Before the mid-1970's, most states' rape laws required prompt
reporting of the crime; corroboration by other witnesses; physical resistance by
the victim; and cautionary instructions to the jury about the difficulty of
determining the truth of a victim's testimony."); Estrich, supra note 85, at 1099,
1108-09, 1114, 1131 (discussing rape prosecutions under old laws requiring proof
of force, "utmost" or "reasonable" physical resistance, victim's nonconsent and
corroboration; also noting other impediments to a successful rape prosecution
including cautionary jury instructions, the fresh complaint rule and evidentiary
rules allowing evidence of victim's prior sexual conduct).
88 CROWELL, supra note 8, at 33 ("[T]he rate of forcible rape reported to
police [between 1973-1993] increased 54.9 percent, but it is not known how
much of that increase may reflect increased willingness of women to report rape
to the police and how much is an actual increase in the rate of rape." (citation
omitted)).
" See, e.g., Frank v. State, 35 N.W.2d 816, 822 (Neb. 1949) ("[I]n cases
wherein a woman charges a man with a sex offense, immorality has a direct
connection with veracity, and ... direct evidence of the general reputation of the
prosecutrix for sexual morality may be shown by defendant ... cross-examina-
tion of the prosecutrix should be as unrestrained and searching as is consistent
with rules of law" and it is error to exclude "any direct competent evidence not
too remote in time, showing specific immoral or unchaste acts and conduct by
her with others."). See also CROWELL, supra note 8, at 126 (discussing
admissibility of victim's sexual history prior to rape law reform); CENTER FOR
WOMEN POLICY STUDIES, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AS BIAS MOTIVATED
HATE CRIME: DEFINING THE ISSUES 2 (1991).
9 See CROWELL, supra note 8, at 125 (listing changes in rape laws
including: "gradation of offenses; focus on behavior of offender rather than
consent of victim; inclusion of rape shield provisions; elimination of witness
VA WA AND GENDER ANIMUS 267
federal and state levels such that, with minor exceptions, a rape
victim may not be questioned as to her sexual past or her character
for "promiscuity. "9' Notwithstanding these statutory changes, the
corroboration; elimination of prompt reporting; elimination of cautionary
instructions; and elimination of marital exclusion" as well as "gender-neutral
definition[s] of rape"); PEGGY REEVES SANDAY, A WOMAN SCORNED 178-83
(1996) [hereinafter, A WOMAN] (discussing reform of rape laws between 1974
and 1980).
9' SANDAY, A WOMAN, supra note 90, at 179 (noting that after law reform
"defense attorneys were no longer able to probe into a victim's sexual history at
will"). FED. R. EvID. 412(a) provides the following statutory rape-shield
language:
Evidence generally inadmissible. The following evidence is not admissible in any
civil or criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct except as
provided in subdivisions (b) and (c):
(1) Evidence offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged in other
sexual behavior.
(2) Evidence offered to prove any alleged victim's sexual predisposition.
Id.
See also ALA. CODE § 12-21-203 (1995); ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.045 (Michie
Supp. 1996); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 16-42-101 (Michie 1995); CAL. EVID. CODE
§§ 782, 1103(b) (West 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. §18-3-407 (1997); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 54-86f (West 1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 §§ 3508, 3509
(1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022(2), (3) (West 1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2-
3 (Michie 1995); HAW. REV. STAT. ch. 626, Rule 412 (1993); IDAHO CODE § 18-
6105 (1997); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/115-7 (West 1993); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 35-37-4-4 (West 1994); IOWA R. EVID. 412 (1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-
3525 (1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.145 (Michie 1990); LA. CODE EvID.
ANN. art. 412 (West 1996); ME. R. EVID. 412 (1997); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 461A (1996); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 21B (1986); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 750.520j (West Supp. 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.347(3),(4),-
(6) (West 1987); MiSS. CODE ANN. §§ 97-3-68,-69 (1994); MO. REV. STAT.
§ 491.015 (1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-511(2),(3) (1997); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 28-321 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. §§48.069, 50.090 (1986); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 632-A:6 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-7 (West 1995); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 30-9-16 (Michie 1995); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42 (McKinney
1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule 412 (1992); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-20-
14,-5 (1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2907.02(D)-(F) (Anderson 1996);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2412 (1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.210 (1995); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3104 (West 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13 (1994); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-3-659.1 (Law Co-op. 1997); SD. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-22-15
(Michie 1988 & Supp. 1997); TENN. R. EVID. 404 (1997); TEx. R. CRIM. EvID.
412 (1995); UTAH R. EvID. 412 (1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3255 (1994
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victim-blaming attitude toward rape has not been removed from
societal thinking and it remains part of the American socialization
process.
92
Sexual stereotypes are also part of the socialization process
which fosters rape.93 While women are socialized to "resist sexual
advances, ' 94 men are taught to "initiate sexual activity" thus
creating a framework for rape.95 The notion that men are to be
sexually aggressive and women sexually passive lays the founda-
tion for a myriad of "rape myths. 96
& Supp. 1997); VA. CODE §§ 18.2-67.7,-67.10(5) (Michie 1996); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 9A.44.020(2)-(4) (West 1988); W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-1 1(a), (b)
(1997); WIS. STAT. §§ 972.11(2), 971.31(11) (1985 & Supp. 1997); WYo. STAT.
ANN. § 6-2-312 (Michie 1988 & Supp. 1997). See also State v. Reinhold, 597
P.2d 532 (Ariz. 1979).
92 See, e.g., SANDAY, A WOMAN, supra note 90, at 208-2 1. In discussing the
1991 rape trial of William Kennedy Smith, Sanday addresses the defense
lawyer's ability to portray the victim as an "unattached young woman, who had
left her illegitimate child at her mother's for the night, [who] was out for a night
on a town famous for its bars frequented by rich men and fortune seeking
women" without ever violating the state rape shield laws. SANDAY, A WOMAN,
supra note 90, at 219. Sanday also notes the media reaction which tended to
blame the victim while praising Smith. SANDAY, A WOMAN, supra note 90, at
214-17. For example, the New York Times published two articles covering the
rape: the first revealed the victim's name and profiled her private life, while the
second "glowing" article wrote about Smith and his "thoughtful" and "harmless"
personality. SANDAY, A WOMAN, supra note 90, at 215-16. The Times described
Smith's victim as a woman who led a "leisurely life in South Florida" courtesy
of her wealthy stepfather and noted that she "gave birth to a daughter by a local
man she did not marry." Fox Butterfield & Mary B.W. Tabor, Woman in Florida
Rape Inquiry Fought Adversity and Sought Acceptance, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17,
1991, at A17. The Times also stated that the victim had "a little wild streak" and
"below-average grades" in high school, that she had numerous speeding tickets
and that she "frequented Palm Beach's expensive bars." Id. See also infra notes
96-106 and accompanying text (discussing persistent rape myths in society).
93 CROWELL, supra note 8, at 66 ("[Sexual] scripts support violence when
they encourage men to feel superior, entitled, and licensed as sexual aggressors
with women as their prey, while holding women responsible for controlling the
extent of sexual involvement.").
94 CROWELL, supra note 8, at 66.
95 CROWELL, supra note 8, at 66.
9' Rape myths are a series of sexual scripts learned by men and women
which perpetuate American rape culture. Studies show that more men than
268
VAWA AND GENDER ANIMUS
The first set of rape myths serves to "excuse the rape. 97 First
is the idea that women secretly wish to be raped, and therefore, the
rapist is not truly acting against the woman but is fulfilling her
wishes.98 This notion was put into words by a Maryland judge
who, in a dissent to an appellate decision upholding a conviction
of rape, remarked that the facts did not suggest "anything other
than a pattern of conduct consistent with the ordinary seduction of
a female acquaintance who at first suggests her disinclination .
...,,99 A corollary to the myth that women desire rape is the
common belief that when a "nice girl" says "no" to sex, she really
means "yes."' ° She is only acting out her role as a proper
woman by pretending to be disinterested in intercourse which she
really desires. This belief extends into the proposition that victims
of rape are not "nice girls," but are actually "fallen women" who
women accept rape myths and that more "self-reported, sexually aggressive" men
accept these myths. CROWELL, supra note 8, at 66.
The rape myths embedded in American society are identified and discussed
in Susan Griffin, Rape: The All-American Crime, reprinted in WOMEN AND
VALUES: READINGS IN RECENT FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY 203 (Marilyn Pearsall ed.,
2d ed. 1993).
9 CROWELL, supra note 8, at 66.
9 Griffin, supra note 96, at 205 ("A young woman who was raped by the
husband of a friend said that days after the incident the man returned to her
home, pounded on the door and screamed to her, 'Jane, Jane. You loved it. You
know you loved it."').
99 State v. Rusk, 424 A.2d 720, 733 (Md. 1981) (Cole, J. dissenting), cert.
denied, 467 U.S. 1255 (1984) (emphasis supplied). After giving the defendant a
ride home from a bar, the victim in Rusk refused the defendant's invitation to
join him in his apartment. In response to this refusal, the defendant took the
victim's car keys, thus luring her into the apartment against her wishes. Id. at
721. Inside the apartment the victim, who was frightened to death, submitted to
kissing the defendant while "begging him" to let her go. Id. at 722. The
defendant did not let her go. Instead he continued to kiss and touch the victim
until she acquiesced to oral sex and vaginal intercourse with him as he "lightly
choked" her. Id.
1(x) Koss, supra note 77, at 8 (describing "victim masochism" myths: "It
wasn't rape, only 'rough sex.' Women say no when they mean yes. Some
women enjoy rape."); Griffin, supra note 96, at 206 (describing the myth that
"not only does a woman mean 'yes' when she says 'no,' but that a really decent
woman ought to begin by saying 'no,' and then be led down the primrose path
to acquiescence").
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provoke their attackers by their dress, their words or their
actions.'0 ° These myths, that women desire rape, deserve rape or
provoke rape, allow men to justify rape and relieve themselves
from any guilt or personal responsibility resulting from rape.
A second set of rape myths "minimize the seriousness of
rape."' °2 Some of these "minimizing" myths justify men's behav-
ior: "he paid for her date," "he had to release sexual 'tension,' "he
was drinking" and "he didn't mean it.' 0 3 Others deny any true
harm because the victim "wasn't a virgin" or she suffered "no
bruises." °4 A final myth asserts that rape does not occur at all:
women "cry rape" for revenge or to protect their "reputations."' 0 5
The fact that rape is actually one of the most under-reported of
crimes belies this final myth."°6
Our culture reflects and promotes violence against women;
women and men are socialized in an environment of deep gender
animus. Graphic depictions of violence against women in both
mainstream television and movies may serve to "desensitize" men
to "real world violence" against women.'0 7
Additionally, pornography reflects societal hatred of women and
may encourage sexual violence against women.'0 8 One woman
'M KOSS, supra note 77, at 8 (describing "victim precipitation" myths:
"Women provoke rape by the way they dress, by 'leading men on.' ... It only
happens to certain types of women."); Griffin, supra note 96, at 205, 207-08.
102 CROWELL, supra note 8, at 66.
'(3 KOSS, supra note 77, at 8-9.
10 KOSS, supra note 77, at 9.
'05 KOSS, supra note 77, at 8 (describing "victim fabrication" myths).
'06 KOSS, supra note 70, at 160 (showing rape as one of the most underre-
ported crimes according to Uniform Crimes reports assembled by the FBI).
'()7 CROWELL, supra note 8, at 64.
'08 Accounts of rape victims whose assaults were incited, in part, by
pornography can be found in Testimony from Public Hearings on the Ordinance
to Add Pornography as Discrimination Against Women, in MAKING VIOLENCE
SEXY: FEMINIST VIEWS ON PORNOGRAPHY 48-62 (Diana E. H. Russell ed.,
1993). One account goes as follows: three men on a hunting trip, reading
pornographic magazines, saw a thirteen-year-old Girl Scout in the woods. Id. at
48-49. One man yelled "[t]here is a live one," and the three began to chase the
young girl. Id. The three men caught the girl and raped her, forcing her to
engage in both vaginal and oral intercourse. Id. at 48-49. After raping the young
Girl Scout, they kicked leaves and pine needles on her and "told [her] that if
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[she] wanted more [to] come back the next day." Id. at 49.
Another woman recalls being sexually terrorized by a man for years. At
times he would look at pornographic magazines and would make "hateful,
obscene, violent remarks about women in general and about me. He told me that
because I am female I am here to be used and abused by him, and that because
he is a male he is the master and I am his slave." Id. at 51.
A former prostitute recounts a story of being raped by a group of three men.
Id. at 59. Upon meeting one man in a hotel room, she was tied to a chair and
gagged. Id. The man then left the room, returning about one hour later with two
other men and some S and M magazines. Id. The three men proceeded to attach
nipple clips to her breasts, to burn her with cigarettes, and to rape and beat her
continuously for twelve hours. Id. The woman summarized her experiences as
a prostitute stating:
[m]en constantly witness the abuse of women in pornography and if
they can't engage in that behavior with their wives, girlfriends, or
children, they force a whore to do it. My wish is that you could see
with my eyes just for a day how clear the relationship is between
pornography and the systematic abuse of women.
Id. at 60.
Research supports the testimony of these victims of pornography, showing
that it is significantly related to misogyny and does indeed encourage male
violence against women. See, e.g., CROWELL, supra note 8, at 63 (noting that
"exposure to pornography under laboratory conditions has been found to increase
men's aggression toward women, particularly when a male participant has been
affronted, insulted, or provoked by a woman"); Koss, supra note 77, at 26-27
(discussing research which has found that, in addition to sexual offenders, "males
who have not been sexually aggressive may also be aroused by rape depictions
that involve adult women, especially if the woman is portrayed as enjoying the
experience"; also noting that "the U.S. Attorney General's Commission on
Pornography [has] concluded that exposure to media depictions of violence
against women promotes rape"); SANDAY, A WOMAN, supra note 90, at 205-06
(citing 1993 article by Neil Malamuth, who, after major research on the
connection between pornography and violence against women, concluded that
"[tihere seems to be scientific support for the hypothesis of harmful effects on
some men of certain types of pornographic stimuli," especially those which are
violent and degrading).
Finally, pornography not only incites violence against women, it "is violence
against women." ANDREA DWORKIN, Pornography's Part in Sexual Violence, in
LETTERS FROM A WAR ZONE 206-09 (1993). For example, Linda Lovelace, an
ex-pornography actress recounts "years as a sexual prisoner during which she
was tortured and restricted from all normal human contact." Gloria Steinem, The
Real Linda Lovelace, in MAKING VIOLENCE SEXY, supra at 23-24. Ms. Lovelace
was "beaten and raped so severely and regularly that she suffered rectal damage
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explains that her sexually abusive husband "got his ideas from...
pornography":
Having sex, how he wanted it, was nonnegotiable. He had
a fetish about hating pubic hair. He used to shave his and
mine. Once he slipped and slit my clitoris.... Once we
saw an X-rated film that showed anal intercourse. After
that, he pressed me to try it. I agreed to once, but found
the experience very painful, but he kept trying to do it
again. . . . He also used to pinch and bite me. ... [H]e
said "It's supposed to hurt." . . . [Plornography is part of
making our husbands into rapists.'O°
Wife-rape is one example of how American society fosters
gender animus and perpetuates rape. Marital rape is not uncommon.
One study, using a narrow definition of rape, found that "14% of
ever-married women had been raped by a husband or ex-husband
at least once."'" 0 This statistic likely underestimates instances of
marital rape as it is "least likely to be reported by [adult] women
victims.""'
plus permanent injury to the blood vessels in her legs." Id. at 25.
"9 Rev. Susan Wilhem, Testimony on Pornography and Marital Brutality,
in MAKING VIOLENCE SEXY, supra note 108, at 46-47.
'M KOSS, supra note 77, at 44; Eskow, supra note 51, at 685 (citing 1978
study of 930 women in San Francisco which showed that 14% of married women
had been raped by their husbands at least one time). Some women have been
raped by their husbands multiple times. One woman asserted:
I actually refer to my whole marriage as marital rape. Several times,
especially following the incidents where my husband asked our friends
to come to bed with us when I was already asleep, he felt it was his
privilege if he was at all sexually turned on or needing to be gratified,
to rape me. Most of the time I would wake up. Sometimes I would just
keep my eyes closed and try to tolerate it.
Testimony from Public Hearings on the Ordinance to Add Pornography as
Discrimination Against Women, in MAKING VIOLENCE SEXY, supra note 108, at
54.
"' KOSS, supra note 77, at 47. The reasons given for not reporting marital
rape are "humiliation, fear [of disbelief of others] or of [being] devalued for
having participated in such sexual activity, and belief that forcible sexual
relations are the right of a husband or other male partner." Id&
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Historically, marital rape was exempted from the criminal law
based on notions of women as property, marital privacy and the
idea that a wife consents to all sexual intercourse within mar-
riage. 2 Although marital rape is now a crime in all states,
distinctions between rape within marriage and other types of rape
still exist.
13
Marital rape myths serve to perpetuate traditional notions of
property, privacy and consent within marriage. These myths are
identified by Lisa Eskow, 14 and illustrated by the writing of
Professor Glanville Williams in his argument against wholly
abolishing the marital rape exemption."5 First is the myth that
"husbands ... have an absolute right to sex on demand."'" 6 In
distinguishing between stranger rape and marital rape (not involv-
ing a weapon or physical injury), Williams explains:
[o]ccasionally some husband continues to exercise what he
regards as his right when his wife refuses him, the refusal
most probably resulting from the fact that the pair have
had a tiff. What is wrong with his demand is not so much
the act requested but its timing, or the manner of the
demand. 117
This idea of a husband's right to sexual intercourse was also
expressed by a South Carolina husband acquitted of a violent
marital rape who remarked: "How can you rape your own
wife?""' 8 This marital rape myth has its counterpart in women
1.2 See supra note 84 and accompanying text (discussing Lord Hale's notions
of "consent" and marital rape).
113 See supra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing treatment of marital
rape under state laws).
14 See Eskow supra note 51, at 688 (discussing marital rape myths).
"s Glanville Williams, The Problem of Domestic Rape, in RAPE AND THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 269, 271 (Jennifer Temkin ed., 1995). Williams'
article refers to the English marital rape exemption, however, he refers to the
American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, the American police experience and
an Oregon case in making his argument against the abolition of marital rape). Id.
at 270.
116 Eskow, supra note 51, at 688.
"' Williams, supra note 115, at 270.
118 Koss, supra note 77, at 15. See POSNER, supra note 83, at 389-90.
Posner lists reasons for the traditional marital rape exemption, some of which are
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who "feel duty-bound to submit to sex in marriage."" 9 Moreover,
this myth is expressed in women's failure to recognize instances of
marital rape, or their hesitation to admit to these occurrences. For
example, wives speaking about sexual contacts with their husbands
have stated: "'[I]t was almost like rape'; or 'he pinned me down
like he was raping me'; or 'it was just like a rape, except I was on
[my own] bed."" 120
A final marital rape myth is the "view [of] marriage as
consenting perpetual, even contractual consent."' 2' In accordance
with this myth, Williams explains why a stranger rapist is worse
than a husband-rapist stating that "the first offender never received
consent, while the second has received favour in the past and is
now perhaps only temporarily out of favour.' 22 These myths
allow for the perpetuation of marital rape and the American ideal
which "equat[es] conjugal relations with domestic bliss."' 123
A second example of how American society fosters and
encourages rape can be found in a study of fraternity life, and
fraternity gang rape in particular. Gang rape on college campuses
is, unfortunately, not rare:
Gang Rapes have become a despicable and horrifying trend
within the higher education community, usually perpetrated
by athletic team members and fraternity brothers. Virginia
Tech's wide receiver is again facing rape charges, along
with the team's fullback, not even two years after his
assault on Kristy [sic] Brzonkala. Three Morehouse
basketball players were charged last October for raping a
reflective of marital rape myths. For example, the idea of a husband's right to
intercourse is found in the description of marriage in sexually repressive societies
which prize "premarital virginity" and "marital chastity." POSNER, supra note
83, at 389. In such marriages "virtually the only services that a wife contributes
to the marriage are sexual and procreative, and if she tries to deprive her
husband of these services, she is striking at the heart of the marriage." POSNER,
supra note 83, at 389.
" Eskow, supra note 51, at 688.
12" Eskow, supra note 51, at 690.
121 Eskow, supra note 51, at 688; see supra note 84 (discussing "consent"
and marital rape).
122 Williams, supra note 115, at 270.
123 Eskow, supra note 51, at 690.
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Spellman freshman in the dormitory; five Grambling State
football players were charged last November for raping a
local 17-year-old girl who wandered into their dormitory;
three Southwestern Michigan College basketball players
were charged with raping an 18-year-old woman and video
taping their crime last November . . . other recent gang
rapes committed by students were reported at Appalachian
State, Virginia State University and Clemson University.
Sexual assaults on campus have reached epidemic propor-
tions according to studies which indicate that approxi-
mately 25% of all college co-eds will be victimized during
4 years of undergraduate study.
24
In an effort to demonstrate how American society fosters and
encourages rape, the college fraternity, viewed as a microcosm of
traditional Western (heterosexual) male society, may be used as an
example. 125 In a study of fraternity life, one author observed that
124 Higher Education Reauthorization; Hearing on Campus Crime and the
Accuracy in Campus Crime Reporting Act of 1997: Hearings on H.R. 715 Before
the Subcomm. on Higher Education and the Workforce Comm., 105th Cong.,
available in 1997 WL 11235069 (testimony of Benjamin F. Clery, President,
Security on Campus, Inc.).
125 This is not to say that all fraternities encourage or partake in gang rape.
In fact, in a later work by Peggy Reeves Sanday, the author of FRATERNITY
GANG RAPE, infra note 126, Sanday emphasized "that being a member of a
fraternity per se is not related to sexual assault." SANDAY, A WOMAN, supra note
90, at 201.
Sanday notes that regular alcohol and nicotine use and "participation in
organized athletics" are more important predictors of "sexual aggression" than
"fraternity affiliation." SANDAY, A WOMAN, supra note 90, at 201. See also
William Douglas, Disturbing Pattern Seen in Gang Rapes; Many Linked to Male
Rules of 'Bonding,' N.Y. NEWSDAY, May 13, 1990, at.2 (noting that college
gang rapes will generally be found where "peer pressure, alcohol and drug abuse
and all-male groups" co-exist and citing Cornell University professor Andrea
Parrot who estimates "that about 80 to 90 percent of the men involved in gang
sex attacks are members of fraternities or student-athletic groups, usually the
football or basketball team").
Finally, Sanday has recognized (though not optimistically) that fraternities
have the potential to be "constructive agents for change ... where young males
can learn responsible sexual behavior." SANDAY, A WOMAN, supra note 90, at
201-02. For example, at least two national fraternities have formally denounced
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discourse between fraternity brothers focuses on sexuality and
sexual conquest as the primary expression of masculinity.
126
Conversations with fraternity brothers often refer to "working a yes
out," that is, coercing a woman into sexual intercourse either
through verbal pressure or through giving her drugs and alcohol, or
both.' 27 Language reflective of the previously discussed rape
myths is abundant in this study. 28 For example, a "no" might
mean "yes" because "[i]f she sticks around, that's your signal that
she's not quite ready to do anything, but she's still interested in
sexual abuse. ROBIN WARSHAW, I NEVER CALLED IT RAPE 110 (1988). An
article in Sigma Alpha Epsilon's national magazine wrote:
We thought the friendly "gang bang" was O.K. After all, the woman
went along with it. Wrong, brothers. Not only is the "gang bang" itself
wrong by legal standards - it's rape no matter how you rationalize it
- but it's an act of violence based on a perverted myth of masculinity
and sexuality.
Id.
126 PEGGY REEVES SANDAY, FRATERNITY GANG RAPE: SEX, BROTHERHOOD,
AND PRIVILEGE ON CAMPUS 113 (1990) [hereinafter, FRATERNITY]. The author
of this study trained students to interview the fraternity brothers quoted in the
following conversations, as well as interviewing other men and women around
one campus where a highly publicized gang rape occurred. Id. at 16. The
interviews took place over the course of two years. Id. All conversations were
tape recorded and later transcribed, with the permission of the interviewees. Id.
Some students wrote about their fraternity experiences for the author. Id. The
author studied instances of gang rape at other campuses through newspaper and
magazine reports, a police report, an interview with a victim from another
campus, and a nationwide study conducted by Mary P. Koss. Id. at 17.
127 Id. at 115. Other examples of "fraternity" language which reflect attitudes
that might foster gang rape are collected in ROBIN WARSHAW, I NEVER CALLED
IT RAPE, supra note 125. For example "new meat" refers to freshman and
transfer women; "cattledrives" and "hogfests" are synonyms for parties;
"landsharking" occurs when "a frat member kneels on the floor behind [a]
woman and bites her" buttocks; a "rude hogger award" refers to the "fraternity
member who has sex with the woman deemed most ugly by the other frat
members"; and "ledging" refers to "woman's being driven to the point of
suicide" by months of harassment she is subjected to by brothers who were
secretly invited to watch her engage in intercourse with one fraternity brother.
WARSHAW, supra note 125, at 108-09.
"' See supra notes 96-106 and accompanying text (discussing rape myths).
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you, so it's worth trying . ... ,1 Other myths are reflected in
comments about a victim of a gang rape who "just totally brought
everything onto herself."'130 The comments go on to state that
"[s]he drugged herself... she was responsible for her condition,
and that just [left] her wide open . ... ,,13' Additionally, fraternity
brothers generally divide women into four groups: "frigid," who are
unresponsive to sexual advances; "teases," who allow sexual
advances up to a point; "sluts," who have had sex with "too many"
men; and "girlfriends," who are likely the only women deemed
"nice girls" by the other brothers. 132
Discourse between fraternity brothers also centers around male
dominance. In fact, fraternities are formed because the group
structure provides more power or control on campus. 133 Watching
pornography, reading pornographic magazines and making sexual
jokes are all aspects of the fraternity culture which encourage male-
bonding and male power.' 34 In its extreme, the ritual and bonding
of fraternity culture leads to gang rape. 135 Fraternity gang rape
(and rape involving college athletics) has been reported at "'public,
private, religiously affiliated, Ivy League, large and small"'
129 SANDAY, FRATERNITY, supra note 126, at 121.
130 SANDAY, FRATERNITY, supra note 126, at 119.
131 SANDAY, FRATERNITY, supra note 126, at 119.
132 SANDAY, FRATERNITY, supra note 126, at 125-26.
133 SANDAY, FRATERNITY, supra note 126, at 125.
134 SANDAY, FRATERNITY, supra note 126, at 126-30. See also WARSHAW,
supra note 125, at 107-08 (discussing "antiwomen sentiments" displayed in
fraternity "rush" events, rituals, skits and publications).
131 SANDAY, FRATERNITY, supra note 126, at 19-20; WARSHAW, supra note
125, at 105-06:
The culture of many fraternities instills in members a group ethos
which objectifies and debases women through language and physical
aggression, which lauds heavy drinking and other drug use, and which
reinforces group loyalty through united behavior-especially antisocial
and sometimes illegal behavior. [This culture] provide[s] a good
medium for gang rape.
See also Douglas, supra note 125, at 2 (citing Professor Andrea Parrott on gang
rape: "These men are raping for each other, raping to prove their virility to their
other friends . .. its also to prove loyalty to their friends, a way of saying 'If
you'll do it, I'll do it."').
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universities alike. 36 The rape becomes part of the fraternity
culture, and the fact that no one person raped a woman takes
responsibility away from all of the actors.
In the larger American society, rape is often committed by an
individual actor. 137 However, the male socialization process and
the surrounding culture which fosters male bonding and male domi-
nance often allows men to deny any responsibility for the victim-
ization of women. People view rape as an isolated and private
incident of violence between two people, where the aggressor
happens to be male and the victim female. 38 The difficulty with
this "private" view of rape, as described by May and Strikwerda,
is that "[b]oth the 'climate' that encourages rape and the 'sociali-
zation' patterns which instill negative attitudes about women are
difficult to understand or assess when one focuses on the isolated
individual perpetrator of rape."'
139
In fact, rape as sexualized violence reflects the gender animus
inculcated in men through the American socialization process. The
socialization process itself does not cause men to rape. The gender
animus which is instilled in most men through this process, when
coupled with individual determinants, however, may cause an
individual to rape. Individual determinants may include physio-
logy,'4  alcohol use,' 4 ' psychopathology and personality
traits.'42 Rapists may display a variety of individual determinants;
136 SANDAY, FRATERNITY, supra note 126, at 2.
137 CROWELL, supra note 8, at 1 (reporting that more than 75% of rapes are
committed by an individual known to the victim).
13' Larry May & Robert Strikwerda, Men in Groups: Collective
Responsibility for Rape, 9 HYPATIA 13, 135-36 (1994) (arguing that rape is
actually a "crime against humanity" "perpetrated by men as a group" "not merely
a crime against a particular woman" committed "by the individual rapist").
139 Id. at 137.
"' CROWELL, supra at 8, at 52-54 (noting that physiology may contribute to
male aggression although no conclusive studies of humans have shown this to
be true).
141 CROWELL, supra note 8, at 54-56 (noting that alcohol use is reported in
up to 75% of acquaintance rapes, but recognizing that "many ... sexual assaults
occur in the absence of alcohol, and many people drink without engaging in
violent behavior").
142 CROWELL, supra note 8, at 56-58 (noting that "a wide variety of
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however, a common link among rapists is that all have been
socialized to harbor gender animus which is expressed in the rapes
they commit. 14
3
While the male socialization process serves to make gender
animus an underlying factor in almost all rapes, every rape can be
seen as an expression of gender animus on a societal level, as rape
serves to maintain the American power structure of dominance and
dependency. Rape is a crime which systematically subordinates all
women by instilling a fear of rape among women as a collective
group.144 Rape is a means for a man to assert his perceived
psychiatric and personality disorders have been diagnosed among sexual
offenders, frequently some type of antisocial personality disorder").
143 In her study of convicted rapists, Diana Scully notes:
It is important to understand that the socialization process of all
members of society is influenced, to some degree, by a common set of
values. Thus, men who rape should not harbor beliefs that are
drastically different from those of other men, but they may have more
extreme attitudes. The difference should be one of degree, not of kind.
SCULLY, supra note 1, at 78.
It should be noted that Richard A. Posner, a judge and scholar, believes that
"rape appears to be primarily a substitute for consensual sexual intercourse rather
than a manifestation of male hostility toward women ...." POSNER, supra note
83, at 384. However, Posner recognizes that the infrequency of male homosexual
rape, and the virtual non-existence of rape "among man's closest relatives, the
non-human primates ... lends some credence to the view that misogyny is an
element in many rapes." POSNER, supra note 83, at 384-85. As previously noted,
to make a successful claim under VAWA, misogyny or "gender animus" need
not be the sole cause of a rape, but must be one "element" underlying a rape. See
supra note 39.
" Single acts of rape institutionalize the subordinate position of women in
American society as the fear of rape prevents women from freely engaging in
civic activities and, instead, forces women to become dependent upon men for
protection. BROWNMILLER, supra note 53, at 15 ("[Rape] is nothing more or less
than a conscious process of intimidation by which all men keep all women in a
state of fear." (italics in original)); Griffin, supra note 96, at 203-04 (describing
the "fear of rape" as "a daily part of every woman's consciousness" which is
learned by women during youth and is carried throughout their lifetimes).
Catharine MacKinnon describes the institutionalization of women's subordinate
position through acts of rape as follows:
Sexual violation symbolizes and actualizes women's subordinate social
status to men .... In social reality, rape and the fear of rape operate
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cross-culturally as a mechanism of terror to control women.... Rape
is an act of dominance over women that works systematically to
maintain a gender-stratified society in which women occupy a
disadvantaged status as the appropriate victims and targets of sexual
aggression. Sexual aggression by men against women is normalized.
In traditional gender roles, male sexuality embodies the role of
aggressor, female sexuality the role of victim, and some degree of
force is romanticized as acceptable.
MacKinnon, supra note 35, at 1302.
That the fear of rape prevents women from fully engaging in civic life is
seen in daily adjustments women make to protect themselves. For example, one
study showed that nearly 50% of women do not want to travel alone at night,
while only 8% of men felt this way. CROWELL, supra note 8, at 87. This fear
precludes women from engaging in social activities (going to a night time
movie), as well as economic activities (seeking night time employment).
Stellings, supra note 6, at 6. See generally MARGARET GORDON & STEPHANIE
RIGER, THE FEMALE FEAR (1989) (describing the fear of rape and its effects on
all women).
Congress recognized that such a fear is instilled in all women through
gender-motivated violence where they wrote: "The violence not only wounds
physically, it degrades and terrorizes, instilling fear and inhibiting the lives of all
those similarly situated." S. REP. No. 138, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 37, 49 (1993).
The fear of rape benefits men as a class as it forces women to seek male
protection, thus maintaining the male position of power. BROWNMILLER, supra
note 53, at 399 (noting that society teaches women that "[diespite the fact that
it is men who are the rapists, a woman's ultimate security lies in being
accompanied by men at all times"); May & Strikwerda, supra note 138, at 148
("In a larger sense, men benefit from the prevalence of rape in that many women
are made to feel dependent on men for protection against potential rapists.").
Rape myths and sexual stereotypes, discussed supra notes 96-106 and accompa-
nying text, serve to foster the rape culture and relieve men from responsibility
for the rape which benefits them as a class. One purpose of VAWA was to
address these stereotypes underlying American society in an effort to end
violence against women. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 138, at 42 ("The Violence
Against Women Act is designed to remedy not only the violent effects of the
problem, but the subtle prejudices that lurk behind it."). In effect, VAWA is
intended to address and cure the subordination of women through gender-
motivated violence, including rape.
It should be mentioned that Richard A. Posner has taken issue with the
assertion that rape is a "method of establishing or maintaining male domination."
POSNER, supra note 83, at 384. Rather, Posner believes that "most rapists want
to have sex, not to make a statement about, or contribute to, the subordination
of women." POSNER, supra note 83, at 385. Yet, in discussing the "rational
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power to dominate and subordinate women. 4 ' As explained by
Andrea Dworkin, men rape "because of the kind of power that men
have over women. That power is real, concrete, exercised from one
body to another body, exercised by someone who feels he has a
right to exercise it, exercised in public and exercised in pri-
vate.' 46 Women are raped because they are women. 47 They
are not raped individually, but are raped indistinguishably by men,
that is, the rapist does not choose his victim based upon a personal
model of human behavior," Posner recognizes that "licensing utility monsters
such as Bluebeard or de Sade to rape would not really be utility maximizing, if
only because of the fear that it would engender in the community as a whole and
the expense of the self-protective measures that this fear would incite." POSNER,
supra note 83, at 386-87. Despite this recognition, Posner fails to see that the
history of state and police inaction in rape cases, as well as American attitudes
toward rape, have effectively created such a license. As a result, as recognized
by Congress, women as a community do carry a fear of rape and this fear comes
at great cost to society in general. Congress recognized the cost of this fear on
society, thus enabling them to use the Commerce power to enact VAWA.
145 One author has noted that men who assault their wives or girlfriends "are
not committing violent acts against an individual who happens to be a woman.
Rather their acts may express a belief that they have a right to dominate and
punish women. This is particularly clear given that up to 75% of domestic
assaults reported to the police occur after separation of the couple." STEPHSON,
supra note 41, at 12. See also BROWNMILLER, supra note 53, at 13 ("[R]ape
became not only a male prerogative, but a man's basic weapon of force against
woman, the principal agent of his will and her fear ... [it] became the vehicle
of his victorious conquest over her being, the ultimate test of his superior
strength, the triumph of his manhood."); CROWELL, supra note 8, at 59
(discussing research which has found "that motives of power and anger are more
prominent in the rationalizations for sexual aggression than sexual desires");
Koss, supra note 77, at 29 (noting study suggesting that power and anger
motives in nonincarcerated sexually aggressive men may outweigh sex motives).
146 DWORKIN, I Want a Twenty-Four Hour Truce During Which There Is No
Rape, in LETrERs FROM A WAR ZONE, supra note 108, at 163.
147 MacKinnon, supra note 31, at 1301, 1307 (asserting that but for a
woman's sex, she would not be sexually assaulted). See BROWNMILLER, supra
note 46, at 309 ("Rape has something to do with our sex. Rape is something
awful that happens to females ...."). See also Stellings, supra note 6, at 193
("That violence against women is sexualized is no accident or mere inevitability
of nature: women are raped because our society views women as appropriate
targets of such aggression by virtue of their femaleness, and because our legal
system as a whole permits it." (footnote omitted)).
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relationship-he does not rape his wife, or his girlfriend, his date
or a stranger as an individual-but rather, he rapes the woman. 48
The acceptance of rape as an act of subordination and an
expression of power where the victims are interchangeable is
evidence that acts of rape are acts of gender animus. Each act of
rape is an act of hostility and disrespect toward women. As some
authors have noted, these acts are analogous to the post-Civil War
lynchings of African-Americans, which were similarly expressions
of dominance committed upon random citizens because of their
race. 149
148 MacKinnon, supra note 35, at 1293, 1301 ("Women are sexually
assaulted because they are women: not individually or at random, but on the
basis of sex, because of their membership in a group defined by gender."
(footnote omitted)). See STEPHSON, supra note 34, at 12 (remarking that men
who assault their wives or girlfriends "are not committing violent acts against an
individual who happens to be a woman. Rather their acts may express a belief
that they have a right to dominate and punish women.").
In rare instances men do rape men. Between 0.6% to 7% of men may be
raped in their lifetimes. Stellings, supra note 6, at 186 n.3 (citing MARY P. Koss
& MARY R. HARVEY, THE RAPE VICTIM: CLINICAL AND COMMUNITY
INTERVENTIONS 27 (2d ed. 1991). Most male rapes occur in prison, and many
prison rapists return to a heterosexual life quickly following their release.
Stellings, supra note 6, at 196 n.44. However, these instances of male-on-male
rape are often consistent with the notion that men rape in part based on an
internalized gender animus, in that men often "'feminize' their male victims in
the process." Stellings, supra note 6, at 196. As described by Stellings, the male
rapist reinforces his masculinity through his domination of another man, while
the victim takes on the role of a "weak" and "passive" "woman ... whore...
bitch ... [or] old lady." Stellings, supra note 6, at 196. These instances of male-
on-male rape, and the process of emasculation that occurs during the rapes, serve
to reinforce the idea that gender animus is a factor in rapes committed by men
on women.
141 See, e.g., MacKinnon, supra note 35, at 1303 ("[S]exual assault in the
United States today resembles lynching prior to its recognition as a civil rights
violation."); Stellings, supra note 6, at 209-12 (describing post-Civil War
violence against African-Americans and the similarities to modem violence
against women and noting that the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 was "remarkable
... [in] its willingness to reach private conduct and its recognition that private
acts of terror threaten the public role of the citizen").
Indeed, Senator Biden likened violence against women to historic race
discrimination when he remarked: "I intend for [VAWA's] primary purpose to
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Even if one does not accept the argument that acts of rape are
expressions of gender animus as they serve to reinforce women's
subordinate status in society, it remains clear that all rapes share
one common theme, namely an underlying basis in gender animus.
Regardless of the individual determinants that cause a person to
commit a stranger rape, an acquaintance rape, date rape or a
marital rape, each act of rape is committed in part because the
rapist has been socialized by American society to maintain some
degree of gender animus.150 This underlying factor common to all
rapes is all that is required under the language of VAWA in order
to bring a claim.' 5' The law, and especially VAWA, should
recognize that gender animus is present in all cases of rape. In
recognizing this, the law should cease to distinguish between the
"real rape," defined by Susan Estrich as the pure stranger rape
occurring between a black male and a white female,15 2 and "non-
traditional rapes" which include all rapes involving less force than
the "real rape." 53 As case law under VAWA has already begun
to make this distinction, 154 Congress should amend the statute to
prohibit this distinction such that rape cases under VAWA will be
decided in accordance with the underlying purpose of the statute.
In addition, federal district courts and circuit courts should adopt
a rebuttable presumption of gender animus in rape cases, thus
creating positive case law in various United States districts. 55
be the symbolic recognition that violence against women is a national tragedy
that warrants the commitment of our National Government - much the same
way as fighting race discrimination has for much of this century." 140 CONG.
REC., supra note 11, at S6102.
'5" See generally Part IV (describing the American male socialization process
and how it encourages the development of gender animus).
151 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(1). "[T]he term 'crime of violence motivated by
gender' means a crime of violence committed because of gender or on the basis
of gender, and due, at least in part, to an animus based on the victim's gender."
Id. (emphasis added).
.52 Estrich, supra note 85, at 1092.
113 Estrich, supra note 85, at 1092.
'14 See supra notes 56-79 and accompanying text (discussing early case law
defining gender animus in a VAWA rape case).
155 Birgit Schmidt Am Busch has also suggested the adoption of a rebuttable
presumption of gender motivation in domestic violence cases brought under the
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V. THE APPLICATION OF A REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION TO
VAWA
In 1973, the Supreme Court decision in McDonnell Douglas
Corporation v. Green, 56 first introduced the concept of a rebutt-
able presumption for cases involving race-based employment
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.117 In McDonnell Douglas the court articulated four ele-
ments necessary for a plaintiff to make a prima facie case of racial
discrimination under Title VII. The elements required to make a
prima facie case are: "(i) [plaintiff] belongs to a racial minority; (ii)
[plaintiff] applied and was qualified for a job for which the
employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite [plaintiff's]
qualifications, [plaintiff] was rejected; and (iv) that, after
[plaintiff's] rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of [plaintiff's] qualifica-
tions."'158 After making a prima facie case, the burden of proof
shifts to the defendant "to articulate some legitimate, nondiscrimi-
natory reason" for the alleged racial discrimination. 5 9 If the
defendant fails to articulate such a reason, judgment may be
entered for the plaintiff.' 6°
VAWA Civil Rights Remedy. See Schmidt, supra note 21, at 24-25. Without
such a presumption, Schmidt believes that many victims of domestic violence
will otherwise be unable to find relief under VAWA. See Schmidt, supra note
21, at 24-25. She also notes that "by requiring victims to prove gender-
motivation, the bill fails to recognize that violence against women in their homes
is gender-motivated and reflects societal misogynist attitudes," thus, "in its
present form, [VAWA] fails to meet its educational and remedial goals."
Schmidt, supra note 21, at 24-25. This same reflection of societal attitudes and
the resulting failure of VAWA also arises in cases of rape falling under the Act.
116 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
17 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h-6 (1994).
158 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
159 Id.
'" If the defendant asserts a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" and thus
meets the burden of production, the court will not grant summary judgment.
Instead, the plaintiff must "prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were
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The McDonnell Douglas rule has since been assumed applicable
in employment discrimination cases involving age, as well as those
involving race.'61 The rule was distinguished and slightly modi-
fied for cases involving Title VII gender discrimination in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins.162 The Supreme Court in Price distin-
guished between mere "pretext" cases where an employer chooses
not to hire a person based on his or her race, and "mixed motive"
cases, such as Price, where an employer's hiring and promotion
decisions are based on both legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons
(e.g. performance) and illegitimate discriminatory reasons (e.g.
gender).163 The Court recognized that in a "mixed motive" case,
a rebuttable presumption which only required an employer to
articulate a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for an employ-
ment decision would allow employers to consider illegitimate
reasons in making employment decisions without reproach.' 6
Instead, the Court held that:
[W]hen a plaintiff in a Title VII case proves that her
gender played a motivating part in an employment deci-
sion, the defendant may avoid a finding of liability only by
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would
have made the same decision even if it had not taken the
plaintiff's gender into account. 165
a pretext for discrimination." Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 253 (1981). In fact, "[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of
fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains
at all times with the plaintiff." Id.
161 See O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 116 S. Ct. 1307,
1310 (1996) (assuming "that application of the Title VII rule to the ADEA [Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq.] context is correct").
For lower court holdings applying the Title VII rule to ADEA claims, see
Matthews v. Department of Labor, 767 F. Supp. 1140 (M.D. Fla. 1991)
(recognizing a rebuttable presumption of discrimination by the employer once
plaintiff has established a prima facie case of age discrimination) and Naphtali
v. Reilly, 777 F. Supp. 1193 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (same).
162 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
163 490 U.S. at 240, n.6.
164 490 U.S. at 273-74 (O'Connor, J. concurring).
165 Price, 490 U.S. at 258.
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In effect, this holding maintains a rebuttable presumption in Title
VII discrimination cases. The difference between this case and race
discrimination cases lies in the burden of persuasion placed upon
the defendant after the plaintiff has made a prima facie case. In a
Title VII case following Price, an employer seeking to overcome
the rebuttable presumption of discrimination must articulate more
than a "legitimate, non-discriminatory reason" for an employment
decision; the employer must prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that he or she would have made the same employment
decision regardless of the plaintiff's gender.
The Supreme Court advocates that the concept of a rebuttable
presumption is useful in discrimination cases. Since the VAWA
Civil Rights Remedy addresses gender discrimination as manifested
through acts of violence, a rebuttable presumption in VAWA cases
would similarly be useful. A "rebuttable presumption" is generally
defined as a presumption giving "particular effect to [a] certain
group of facts in [the] absence of further evidence, and [the]
presumption provides [a] prima facie case which shifts to defendant
the burden to go forward with evidence to contradict or rebut [the]
fact presumed."' 66 Following this definition, as well as Supreme
Court case law, Congress should amend VAWA such that:
Where a person commits a crime of violence rising to the
level of a felony under 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(2)(A) or
(d)(2)(B), and that crime constitutes a rape as defined by
the applicable State or Federal penal code, a rebuttable
presumption of gender animus is created and the plaintiff
meets a prima facie case under 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c).
When this rebuttable presumption of gender animus arises,
the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that such animus was not a
factor in the rape.'67
Practically, such an amendment would require that the plaintiff
make a prima facie case establishing by a preponderance of the
evidence, that (i) she is a woman; (ii) she was the victim of a rape
as defined by the applicable state or federal penal code; and (iii)
166 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 1267.
167 For a discussion of the way "rape" should be defined, see supra note 6.
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that her attacker was a man. 68 Once this prima facie case is
made, the defendant should have a burden of persuasion similar to
that in Price, as rape cases typically involve "mixed motives"
rather than mere "pretext."'' 69 Thus, a defendant must show that
he raped the victim while taking no account of her gender. 7°
Such an amendment will allow victims of rape to employ
VAWA in a manner consistent with the primary purposes of
Congress in enacting VAWA, as defined by Senator Biden. These
purposes are:
[T]o educate the public and those within the justice system
against the archaic prejudices that blame women for the
beatings and the rapes they suffer; to the women the
support and the assurance that their attackers will be
prosecuted; and to ensure that the focus of criminal
proceedings will concentrate on the conduct of the attacker
rather than the conduct of the victim.
71
A Congressional recognition that all rape, unless otherwise
proven,1 72 results from gender animus which is learned through the
'6' Although this formula assumes a female plaintiff and male defendant, the
language of.VAWA is gender neutral. In a case where a male is raped he could
present a similar prima facie case asserting that he is a man, he was raped and
his attacker was a woman. In cases of same-sex rape a person again could make
a prima facie case. It is likely that a defendant in either of these cases would
overcome the burden of persuasion that gender animus was not a factor, thus
requiring the plaintiff to prove that it was indeed a factor.
169 See supra notes 81, 140-142 and accompanying text (discussing
underlying gender animus which, when combined with various individual
determinants, may cause a person to rape).
171 See infra note 172 (discussing ways to rebut presumption of gender
animus).
171 S. REP. No. 138, at 38.
172 In some cases a rapist will be able to overcome the rebuttable presump-
tion and prove he has raped a woman for some reason independent of any gender
animus. For example, sexual sadism, a sexual paraphilia recognized in the
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION'S DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MENTAL DISORDERS [hereinafter DSM-IV] 493, 530 (4th ed. 1994), has been
diagnosed in some rape cases (fewer than 10 percent). GERALD C. DAVISON &
JOHN M. NEALE, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY (5th ed. 1990). A sexual sadist will
be able to prove that he has raped due to an illness rather than animus toward
women, as the sexual sadist "derives sexual excitement from the psychological
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American male socialization process will educate the public as to
the problem of archaic notions of women and rape myths which
foster our American rape culture. Only through such public
education can the true goal of VAWA be reached, that is, to
eradicate rape and gender-motivated violence in its entirety. A
rebuttable presumption of gender animus in rape cases under
VAWA will insure that women are afforded a civil rights remedy
against their attackers, and that civil rights court proceedings will
not focus on the victim's conduct, but rather on the rapist's
conduct. If such measures are not taken under Congress' Civil
Rights Remedy, the goal of granting such rights to rape victims on
a state criminal level will not be realized. Congress must take the
lead in protecting the rights of rape victims in the courtroom.
CONCLUSION
VAWA was properly enacted under Congress' authority to
protect citizens who have suffered civil rights violations. Congress
recognized both the growing problem of violence against women,
especially in the forms of rape and domestic violence, and the fact
that much of this violence is based on discriminatory gender
animus. Congress sought to address discriminatory acts of violence
against women through the Title III Civil Rights Remedy of
VAWA. Unfortunately, the Civil Rights Remedy fails to recognize
that sexual stereotypes and attitudes underlying the American
socialization process serve to create a gender animus which is
harbored within many American men, and which encourages the
or physical suffering (including humiliation) of the victim." DSM-IV, supra, at
530. "Sadism overlaps the concept of rape, though not all rapists are sadists, nor
is the contrary true." ROBERT G. MEYER, ABNORMAL BEHAVIOR AND THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 98 (1992). Some sexual sadists "act on their sadistic
sexual urges with nonconsenting victims." DSM-IV, supra, at 530. These sexual
sadist-rapists are likely to repeat their acts until apprehended. Id.
In addition to sexual sadism, elevated levels of male hormones or other
biochemical abnormalities have been suggested to incite rape. MEYER, supra, at
224. Although "there is no convincing general evidence for this claim," an
individual rapist may be able to prove by medical testimony that he has suffered
from some biochemical disorder which caused him to rape. MEYER, supra, at
224-25.
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acts of almost all rapists. Gender animus is at least a contributing
factor in most instances of rape, regardless of other causes. There
should be no distinction between the stranger-rapist, the date-rapist
and the husband-rapist when determining whether gender animus
was, at least, a partial cause of his act. One federal court has
already made this distinction.' 73 Other courts may or may not
follow this lead. As a preemptive strike, however, Congress should
amend VAWA by recognizing the connection between gender
animus and rape. In addition, district and circuit courts should
adopt a rebuttable presumption of gender animus in rape cases.
Without this recognition, VAWA will not serve its purpose of
breaking down the sexual stereotypes and prejudices, and the
American rape culture, that encourage violence against women.
173 See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text (discussing the Brzonkala
court's distinctions between stranger rape and date rape).
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